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In late December 1862 Union general Ambrose Burnside developed 
plans to march across the Rappahannock and execute a massive turning 
movement against Confederate general Robert E. Lee's troops entrenched 
along the southern banks of the river. Burnside hoped to ring in the new 
year by trapping Lee and his Confederates against the river, capturing 
his army, and redeeming the recent Union defeat at Fredericksburg. In 
so doing, he would also establish a strong position for marching against 
Richmond, the ultimate Union goal. Under ideal conditions, Burnside's 
plan was viable, if risky. However, as often happens in war, conditions 
were nowhere near perfect. 
On January 20, 1863, the day before Burnside planned to initiate the 
campaign, a winter wave cyclone passed into the area, bringing with it 
significant amounts of precipitation. "As soon as the general got his army 
in motion," historianjames McPherson wrote, "the heavens opened, rain 
fell in torrents, and the Virginia roads turned to swamps."1 As geogra-
pher Harold Winters has pointed out, the soils of the region are primar-
ily ultisols - fine-grained, massive, heavily weathered soils that tend to 
form underlying clay layers that impede percolation of water once sat-
urated. Excess moisture must then run off into streams or pool on the 
surface.2 Despite worsening conditions, Burnside chose to push forward. 
Winters noted that the "churning action from moving men, horses, and 
equipment" turned the roads into "deep muddy tracks," and the end of 
the day on January 21 saw Burnside's nearly 75,000 men "bogged down 
and their equipment immobilized."3 The next day the humiliated Union 
troops, still on the northern banks of the Rappahannock, retreated to their 
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original base at Falmouth, haunted by jeers and taunts from their Confed-
erate enemies. After Burnside's disaster, no Union general commenced a 
winter campaign in Virginia again.4 
In analyzing why Burnside's so-called Mud March became such a 
colossal failure, several factors require attention. One element centers on 
Burnside's strategy and whether or not it was inherently flawed. By the 
standards of the day, his plan was neither brilliant nor incompetent, but it 
only had reluctant support from Burnside's fellow officers- a clear mark 
against it. However, had the rains not come and the roads stayed passable, 
the operation had a reasonable chance of success despite its critics. In the 
planning stages, Burnside had enjoyed fair weather and based his opera-
tions on the assumption that similar conditions would prevail. Another 
matter concerns whether or not the plan was effectively executed. The sol-
diers and the officers conducted themselves largely according to plan - as 
far as it was in their power to do so. A third issue is a question of leader-
ship. Though the change in weather brought conditions that merited cau-
tion, Burnside's decision to press on was not unwarranted. Harold Winters 
noted, "As is common in military operations, the mission was paramount 
to all other factors. On that basis, and regardless of the weather," Burn-
side made his decision.5 In addition to strategic imperatives, there were 
political influences that impinged on Burnside's deliberations. The Union 
troops had suffered a demoralizing defeat only a month before. The north-
ern populace was losing faith in the army and Lincoln was pressing for 
a clear and decisive victory. All of these external pressures weighed on 
Burnside when he resolved to proceed. 
In the end, the problem lay not with planning or execution but in lead-
ership. It was Burnside's decision, and his alone, that resulted in failure. 
He erred in thinking his troops and his plan could overcome the obstacles 
nature presented. Burnside's lapse in judgment was a classic example of 
leadership failure in the face of what the nineteenth-century Prussian mili-
tary theorist Carl von Clausewitz called "friction" (Ger.: Friktion). 
In his now-classic treatise, On War, first published in 1832, Clausewitz 
outlined a universal paradox of warfare. He noted, "Everything [in war] 
looks simple; the knowledge required does not look remarkable, the stra-
tegic options are so obvious that by comparison the simplest problem of 
higher mathematics has an impressive scientific dignity. Once war has 
actually been seen the difficulties become clear; but it is still extremely 
hard to describe the unseen, all-pervading element that brings about this 
change of perspective." Clausewitz identified the source for this percep-
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tual shift as friction, which he described as "the only concept that more 
or less corresponds to the factors that distinguish real war from war on 
paper." He explained, "The military machine - the army and everything 
related to it-is basically very simple and therefore seems easy to man-
age. But we should bear in mind that none of its components is of one 
piece: each part is composed of individuals, every one of whom retains 
his potential of friction." To illustrate, Clausewitz described the ideal 
workings of a battalion in which experience, leadership, and discipline 
seamlessly guide the actions of all involved. Practice, however, is "very 
different" from theory, Clausewitz noted, because "every fault and exag-
geration of the theory is instantly exposed in war. A battalion is made up 
of individuals, the least important of whom may chance to delay things 
or somehow make them go wrong."6 As a point of friction (or, in other 
words, as an agent of historical change) the individual, no matter how 
insignificant his role, becomes the fulcrum upon which war pivots. 
Clausewitz argued that overcoming friction is a primary task of any 
good commanding officer. "An understanding of friction is a large part 
of that much-admired sense of warfare which a good general is supposed 
to possess. To be sure, the best general is not the one who is most famil-
iar with the idea of friction, and who takes it most to heart,'' he explained. 
Instead "the good general must know friction in order to overcome it 
whenever possible, and in order not to expect a standard of achievement 
in his operations which this very friction makes impossible."7 Here was 
where Burnside failed - he pressed forward without deviating from his 
original plan despite clear indicators that conditions were against him. 
Burnside's decision, an obvious example of Clausewitzian friction, cost 
him the campaign and his career. 
If Burnside's choice demonstrates the element of human friction in war, 
the change in weather and resulting degradation of marching conditions 
illustrates another aspect of Clausewitz's theory. Clausewitz argued that 
the friction of human agency-that is, the problem of individuals mak-
ing decisions or acting independently- is compounded by additional ele-
ments of chance. The most visible example of this, perhaps, is weather, 
which Clausewitz singled out for explanatory purpose: "Fog can prevent 
the enemy from being seen in time, a gun from firing when it should, a 
report from reaching the commanding officer. Rain can prevent a bat-
talion from arriving, make another late by keeping it not three but eight 
hours on the march, ruin a cavalry charge by bogging down the horses in 
mud, etc." While he acknowledged that "it would take volumes to cover 
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all difficulties" and that he would "exhaust the reader" if he "really tried 
to deal with the whole range of minor troubles that must be faced in war," 
Clausewitz's choice of natural forces as the most illustrative case of chance 
is revealing and extremely useful.8 
As Clausewitz pointed out, wars may be planned on paper but they 
are fought in nature, and environmental forces and conditions are there-
fore fundamental players in military engagements. This was not a revela-
tion when On "War was published, nor will it astonish anyone who has ever 
thought about war. It was certainly no surprise to Civil War combatants, 
regardless of rank, who contended with mud, disease, heat, and insects, 
among other environmental challenges, on a daily basis. However, we can 
draw deeper insight from the platitude if we recast nature away from exist-
ing only as an element of chance, as Clausewitz suggested it was, toward 
possessing agency, as environmental historians have argued it does. In 
doing so, Clausewitz's notion of friction can provide a linguistic and con-
ceptual bridge between military and environmental history, making mutu-
ally intelligible two fields that have a history of talking around each other. 
What follows is not a new analysis of specific Civil War battles or strate-
gies but rather an attempt to reveal confluences of analytical approaches 
between military and environmental history through the lens of a specific 
natural phenomenon - acoustic shadows. The outcome of several Civil 
War battles, and the careers of their commanding officers, hinged in part 
on this acoustical anomaly. Where they occurred, acoustic shadows cre-
ated uncertainty, thereby causing the battle to diverge from plans and test-
ing the leadership skills of the officers in charge. This uncertainty fits the 
definition of friction as well as the concept of nature's agency, revealing 
that military and environmental historians share common ground after all. 
Defining Nature as Friction 
Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) wrote On War between about 1816 and 
1831, after the end of the Napoleonic Wars and during the initial stages 
of the Industrial Revolution. Although his treatise occasionally compares 
armies to machines, it is unlikely that Clausewitz was adopting the lan-
guage of industrialization to elucidate his ideas. 9 Instead, he developed 
his theory of warfare based on his observations of human nature, the 
commonalities he saw in the history of warfare, and on his direct expe-
riences with combat prior to 1815. His goal in writing On War was not to 
establish principles for conducting warfare - he was well aware that every 
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war, indeed every battle, was unique - but instead to present methods 
for learning how to respond to the exigencies of war.10 Among his most 
durable propositions is that war universally entails an element of uncer-
tainty- that is, friction - that cannot be avoided. Great leaders might be 
able to overcome its challenges, but they cannot prepare for every chance 
occurrence. 
Clausewitz scholars long have debated the meaning of friction as well 
as the continued applicability of his treatise as a whole to military affairs.11 
In recent years, some have turned to the social, behavioral, and natural 
sciences for models and insight. In 1993 Alan Beyerchen published 
"Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," in which 
he suggested that nonlinear science and chaos theory better approximate 
Clausewitz's notions of friction and chance than any other interpretive 
framework. He argued that Clausewitz saw war as a "nonlinear phenom-
enon" that "is inherently unpredictable by analytical means."12 He fur-
ther asserted that Clausewitz "perceived and articulated the nature of war 
as an energy-consuming phenomenon involving competing and inter-
active factors, attention to which reveals a messy mix of order and unpre-
dictability." 13 Beyerchen noted that, for Clausewitz, friction encompassed 
"two different but related notions": one was "the physical sense of resis-
tance embodied in the word itself, which in Clausewitz's time was being 
related to heat in ways that would lead ultimately to the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics and the concept of entropy"; the other is more analo-
gous to information theory's definition of "noise," which describes the dif-
ficulty of extracting important information from a constant communica-
tion stream.14 
Like Beyerchen, Barry D. Watts looked to science to make sense of 
Clausewitz's notion of friction. Where Beyerchen hoped to elucidate the 
concept in light of Clausewitz's general theory, Watts intended to analyze 
friction as it applied to modem and future war. He, too, concluded that 
nonlinear dynamics was the best model for understanding friction, but his 
chapter on evolutionary biology adds particular insight into the friction 
phenomenon. There, Watts examined the ways that human physiological 
and psychological capabilities limit soldiers' abilities to perform during 
battle. "There are," he argued, "finite limits, grounded in biology and evo-
lution, to the capabilities of humans to receive sensory data, orient them-
selves by integrating that input with prior experience and information, 
reach plausible decisions about what to do next, and act upon those deci-
sions." 15 Although his conclusions appear somewhat deterministic with 
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regard to human evolution, he acknowledged that technology might serve 
to reduce friction in war. However, Watts noted, "friction will probably 
manifest itself in other ways or in areas that we may not even be able to 
predict."16 This led him to examine what nonlinear dynamics might reveal 
about friction. "Nonlinear dynamics arise from repeated iteration or feed-
back. A system, whether physical or mathematical, starts in some initial 
state. That initial state provides the input to a feedback mechanism which 
determines the new state of the system" and so on, creating a system that 
"can be more complex and less predictable than one might suppose."17 
Nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory are familiar to environmental 
historians, who often tum to the science of ecology for insight into the 
dynamic relationships human societies have developed with the nonhu-
man world.18 Current ecological models recognize that, like human orga-
nizations, natural forces and systems are not monolithic and do not tend 
toward stasis or order. They, too, have constituent parts that may act inde-
pendently of one another in ways that may not be anticipated. That is, 
nature's complexity is not always obvious, and elements of it may act 
in unexpected ways. For example, in a 2008 study, ecologists Becks and 
Arndt concluded, "In nature, environmental conditions may change on 
various time scales. Thus, transitions between different types of dynamic 
behavior may occur frequently .... This makes it likely that short bursts 
of chaos occur commonly but are often overlooked in the real world." 19 
Nature's mutable and potentially unpredictable character approximates 
the role of the individual in Clausewitz's theory, demanding that humans 
adapt their actions and their decisions on changing environmental condi-
tions. Thus, applying Clausewitz's definition of friction to nature, as well 
as to the human individual, allows us to understand the history of war in 
promising new ways. 
Nature as Friction: Acoustic Shadows 
One particularly instructive example of nature as friction is the phenom-
enon of acoustic shadows, which are created by a variety of natural con-
ditions that affect the transmission of sound, leading to problems with 
communication and, in at least three instances during the Civil War, 
challenges in leadership. Acoustic shadow is a phenomenon character-
ized by sound traveling in unexpected ways. Often generated by anoma-
lous weather events or topographical conditions, acoustic shadows cause 
sound to either be stifled or amplified, depending on the peculiarities of 
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the situation. In an acoustic shadow, sounds such as cannon fire might be 
carried more than fifteen, perhaps as far as fifty, miles away, giving the 
impression that a battle is raging in a place it is not; or the same sound 
might fail to travel even two miles, thus preventing reinforcements from 
knowing an engagement is taking place. Physicist Charles Ross, who has 
written articles and a book about acoustic shadows during the Civil War, 
identified four potential causes for the occurrence of the phenomenon. 
The first two, wind direction and sound absorption, Ross suggested, are 
the "simplest and most common." Individuals downwind from the source 
of sound hear it better than those upwind. "In the second instance - sound 
absorption- material [such as vegetation, dense fog, or terrain] between 
the sound source and the listener absorbs most of the original energy, 
rendering the sound inaudible." A third reason for an acoustic shadow is 
air temperature change due to increases in altitude. Sound waves travel 
faster in warmer air, thus "the part of the sound wave nearer the ground 
travels faster than the upper part," bending the entire wave upward and 
"making audibility at a distance worse than it would be if the air were all 
the same temperature." Sometimes, however, temperature inversions, in 
which warmer air lays atop cooler air, cause sound to bend back toward 
earth, thus improving audibility. The fourth possibility is due to changing 
wind speed, also affected by altitude. "Winds generally move faster the far-
ther they get from ground and its friction. As in a temperature inversion, 
this condition causes the upper part of a sound wave to travel faster, bend-
ing the wave back toward earth. This effect, known as wind shear, com-
petes with the normal upward-bending effects of air cooling as altitude 
increases." In such instances, the sound bounces back and forth, "caus-
ing alternating rings of sound and silence rippling away from the original 
sound." Thus, a sound might jump over listeners normally within range, 
and reach those who would otherwise be out of earshot.20 
Ross pointed to numerous examples of acoustic shadow affecting Civil 
War battles, including engagements at Chancellorsville, Five Forks, and 
Seven Pines (Fair Oaks), and on several separate occasions during the 
battle of Gettysburg.21 Three other battles, however, are particularly in-
structive because acoustic shadows played decisive roles in their outcomes 
and, in two cases, in the futures of their commanding officers. Heavy pre-
cipitation, high winds, and irregular terrain created acoustic shadows dur-
ing the battles of Fort Donelson, Iuka, and Perryville, respectively, and 
constituted points of friction that threatened Union success in each case. 
In the first example, excellence in leadership helped to overcome the 
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Clausewitzian friction caused by the acoustic shadow and helped to estab-
lish the reputation of the commanding officer, Ulysses S. Grant, as an able 
commander. Circumstances in the second instance revealed how nature 
can be a primary cause in the breakdown in communication, with poten-
tially disastrous results; at Iuka, acoustic shadow paired with difficult ter-
rain to nearly derail Union success in Mississippi. The third occasion of 
acoustic shadow resulted in a Military Commission inquiry investigating 
alleged misconduct by the ranking officer, Don Carlos Buell, and caused 
his professional downfall. 
FORT DONELSON, TENNESSEE 
On February 6, 1862, General Grant cooperated with Flag Officer Andrew 
Foote of the U .S. Navy to capture the Confederate position on the Ten-
nessee River at Fort Henry. The joint army-navy operation took mere 
hours, partly because the fort's commander, Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, 
recognized his untenable position early in the battle and moved most of 
his 2,500-man garrison twelve miles east to the much better situated Fort 
Donelson, located on the banks of the Cumberland River. Grant intended 
to move against Donelson on the 8th, but reported .to the chief of staff, 
Brig. Gen. G. W. Cullum, that he was "perfectly locked in by high water 
and bad roads, and prevented from acting offensively, as I should like 
to do. "22 Despite continued muddy roads and high waters, Grant finally 
moved his forces on February 12 from Fort Henry to outside Fort Donel-
son, where he invested the Confederate defenses. His position was some-
what tenuous, as he was unable to transport his siege artillery because 
"half the country [was] under water."23 Nevertheless, Grant had to take 
Donelson; Grant's commanding officer Henry Wager Halleck had pre-
dicted that Fort Donelson would be "the turning point of the war,'' stating 
that it "must be taken at whatever sacrifice. "24 
To capture Fort Donelson, Grant once again required assistance from 
Foote's ironclads. "Hoping to repeat the Fort Henry experience,'' James 
McPherson wrote, "Grant ordered the navy to shell the fort while his 
troops closed the ring to prevent the garrison's escape."25 Fort Donelson 
sat atop a hundred-foot bluff, and its guns enjoyed a decided advantage 
against Foote's already damaged fleet. Early on the first day of battle, 
February 14, the Confederate artillery picked off Foote's ironclads, leav-
ing Grant to continue the attack alone. The same bluffs that enabled 
the Confederates to neutralize the naval threat left them little means for 
escape, however, if Grant's superior numbers succeeded in fully encir-
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cling the fort. To prevent the capture of nearly twenty thousand Confed-
erate troops, the fort's commander,John Floyd ordered an attack against 
Grant's southern flank on the morning of February 15. 
The Confederates benefited in their efforts from a major change in the 
weather. Early February brought unseasonably warm temperatures, but 
on the 13th, a storm front had moved in, bringing with it sleet, snow, and 
a strident north wind, plus temperatures in the low teens.26 Brig. Gen. 
John A. McClernand reported that "the weather turned intensely cold, a 
driving north wind bringing a storm of snow and sleet upon the unpro-
tected men of my division. The night set in gloomily, and the mingled 
rain and snow congealed as they fell, thus painfully adding to the discom-
fort of a destitution of tents and camp equipage, all of which had been left 
behind."27 Gen. Lew Wallace noted that his Union soldiers "laid down as 
best they could on beds of ice and snow, a strong cold wind making the 
condition still more disagreeable. "28 Most of the Union soldiers had dis-
carded their overcoats and blankets, seeing them as unnecessary during 
the recent warm spell. This left them vulnerable to exposure and physi-
cally weakened. 
When the Confederate attack commenced on the morning of the 15th, 
with the storm still raging, Grant was five miles away conferring with 
Foote and was unaware of any of the developments along his line. He had 
expected no action unless he himself initiated it, so he ordered "his divi-
sion commanders to hold their positions until further notice. "29 Despite 
being only a few miles from the action, he did not hear the sounds of 
battle and could not issue updated orders. According to Charles Ross, 
"The sounds of the engagement did not make it to his location for two 
reasons: a howling wind blew from north to south, carrying the sound in 
the opposite direction from him, and a fresh blanket of snow absorbed 
sound in all directions. "30 McClernand's command bore the entirety of 
the offensive and fell back from their positions for nearly a mile. "Demor-
alized and out of ammunition, they were in no condition to stop the 
rebels from escaping through the breach."31 The Confederates, too, suf-
fered heavy losses and did not take advantage of the break in Grant's line. 
During the night, Confederate officers John Floyd, Gideon Pillow, and 
Nathan Bedford Forrest escaped with only a few thousand troops, leaving 
Grant's former West Point classmate Simon Bolivar Buckner to face the 
consequences as the ranking Confederate officer. On February 16 Grant 
reported to Halleck, "We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 
15,000 prisoners, including Generals Buckner and BushrodJohnson."32 
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Grant's congratulatory orders to his troops included acknowledgment 
of the natural forces they had had to overcome: "For four successive 
nights, without shelter, during the most inclement weather known in this 
latitude, they faced an enemy in large force in a position chosen by him-
self. Though strongly fortified by nature, all the safeguards suggested by 
science were added. Without a murmur this was borne, prepared at all 
times to receive an attack, and with continuous skirmishing by day, result-
ing ultimately in forcing the enemy to surrender without conditions."33 
Grant's capture of Fort Donelson provides an opportunity to under-
stand how the forces of nature constitute an element of Clausewitzian 
friction, as well as how more traditional understandings of friction were 
also at play. In this particular case the acoustic shadow shaped the out-
come of the battle, and Grant's career, not just through its chance occur-
rence, but because Grant acted quickly and effectively in response to it 
when he became aware of the obstacle. He was able to staunch the flow 
of the Confederate retreat through redirecting his own army's energy in a 
timely manner. He recognized the friction, understood its direction, and 
took measures, as any good Clausewitzian commander would, to remedi-
ate the damage. Unlike Burnside, who allowed the change in weather to 
defeat him, Grant took decisive action and turned a potential failure into a 
stunning, and personally important, victory. Grant succeeded, and earned 
the admiration of the Lincoln administration, because he adapted most ef-
fectively to the friction that nature, as an agent of historical change, pre-
sented. 
IUKA, MISSISSIPPI 
Iuka, a small settlement located along the Memphis and Charleston rail-
road near the Tennessee River in northeastern Mississippi, became a 
flashpoint in mid-September 1862. Gen. Braxton Bragg, commander of 
Confederate forces in the West, intended to launch a two-pronged inva-
sion into Tennessee and Kentucky and needed his subordinates in Missis-
sippi to keep Grant, newly promoted to commanding officer in the West, 
occupied in that state. Bragg ordered Maj. Gens. Sterling Price and Earl 
Van Dorn to engage Grant at Corinth, Mississippi, an important junc-
tion that served as a main Confederate rail connection in the Mississippi 
Valley. Price enjoyed early success in these efforts when he forced Col. 
Robert Murphy's federal troops from their positions protecting a large 
stockpile of supplies in Iuka, twenty miles southeast of Corinth, on Sep-
tember 14, 1862. In response, Grant ordered a pincer maneuver to com-
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mence on September 18, intending not just to stop Price from advancing 
to Corinth but also to capture his entire army. According to Union plans, 
Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans was to conduct a flanking movement, 
approaching Price's army from the southwest, and turning the Confeder-
ate front toward that direction. Grant instructed Maj. Gen. Edward 0. C. 
Ord to take two divisions east along the railroad to attack what ideally 
would then be Price's rear. Success depended on tight coordination and 
clear communication. However, in a classic case of friction, unexpected 
natural forces hamstrung Grant's plan. 
The landscape between Corinth and Iuka, and south to Jacinto (the 
town from which Rosecrans was to initiate his part of the operation) was 
not ideal for cooperative campaigning. Though the roads were generally 
good, except during times of heavy precipitation, they were separated by 
thick forests and swampy ground. On the surface, this seemed to favor the 
Union plan to establish strongholds on each transportation route leading 
out of Iuka toward the south and west. If the Union troops could main-
tain control over each of these roads, Price would be cut off from Van 
Dom's divisions in western Mississippi. Furthermore, if Ord successfully 
enveloped the Confederates from the rear, Price would be surrounded 
and unable to support Bragg's invasion of Tennessee and Kentucky. How-
ever, according to historian Michael Ballard, "the campaign that unfolded 
fell victim to many problems, including fatal problems with communica-
tions, most attributable to rugged, swampy, and hilly terrain that had not 
been well scouted by Union cavalry."34 
Ord's two divisions moved out by rail along the Memphis and Charles-
ton railroad to his position six miles west of Iuka, where he awaited 
sounds of battle before joining the fight. Ord, in fact, had specific orders 
not to engage Price's troops "unless he should hear firing."35 In contrast, a 
number of factors hampered Rosecrans's march. First, his troops moved 
out toward Jacinto during a major storm, which resulted in some of his 
troops getting lost as they tried to maneuver in the wet darkness through 
the thickly forested terrain.36 These troops had to countermarch for more 
than four hours to get to their prescribed positions, which put Rosecrans 
and the entire Union operation behind a full day. Furthermore, Rosecrans 
found as he neared Iuka that his plan to cover both roads into town made 
for an untenable situation in terms of communication. The Fulton Road 
to the east and the Jacinto Road to the west were separated by "thickly 
brushed, swampy land," making "mutual support impossible."37 Instead, 
he had to concentrate his strength along the western road, leaving Price a 
potential route for escape along the eastern route. 
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The troublesome landscape and poor weather created for Rosecrans 
what historian Russell Weigley called "yet another onset of the peren-
nial friction of war."38 Rosecrans's troops began skirmishing with Price's 
early on the morning of September 19 and became fully engaged with 
them until around 4:30 that afternoon. When news reached Price of Rose-
crans's movement to Iuka, he did what Grant had expected him to: he 
moved two brigades to face the imminent threat, leaving a smaller, vul-
nerable force in front of Ord. Ord failed to take advantage of the situa-
tion, however, because he never heard the cue to attack- the sound of 
cannon fire. He later reported that on the afternoon of the battle Gen. 
L. F. Ross saw "dense smoke" around 4 p.m. "arising from the direction 
of Iuka." At the time, Ord concluded "that the enemy [were] evacuat-
ing and destroying the stores."39 The next morning, Ord heard guns and 
"moved rapidly into Iuka and found it had been evacuated during the 
night." He was surprised because those guns "were the first heard by us, 
although on the afternoon of the 19th the head of General Rosecrans' 
column had engaged the enemy 2 miles south of Iuka about the time that 
General Ross reported a smoke in the direction of Iuka. The wind, freshly 
blowing from us in the direction of Iuka during the whole of the 19th, 
prevented our hearing the guns and co-operating with General Rose-
crans. "40 He def ended his actions in his official report to Grant by reiter-
ating Grant's own orders: "You expressed the opinion that General Rose-
crans was from last accounts from him too far from Iuka for us to attack 
on our front until further information was received as to his whereabouts, 
which was manifestly true. At the same time you directed me to move my 
whole force forward to within 4 miles of Iuka, and there await the sounds 
of an engagement between Rosecrans and the enemy before engaging the 
latter. "41 In the end, Price escaped on the road Rosecrans failed to block, 
and when the "Union pincers finally closed," James McPherson wrote, 
"they grasped an empty town. "42 
Historians of the battle note many elements of friction in the contest for 
Iuka, but all point to natural phenomena as the reason for Ord's failure 
to engage when needed. Charles Ross attributed it to an acoustic shadow 
caused by wind direction.43 Russell Weigley's assessment is the same: "A 
strong north wind kept Ord from hearing the fight."44 Without stating 
the cause, Jam es McPherson noted that "an acoustic shadow masked all 
sound of the fighting from Ord, whose troops remained in blissful igno-
rance of Rosecrans's battle a few miles away."45 Peter Cozzens provided 
the most extensive analysis, pointing to numerous reports among Ord's 
command that no cannon fire had been heard and, coincidentally, that a 
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strong wind was present. Cozzens also noted that such testimony "does 
not square with the recollections of those on the battlefield." There, "sol-
diers in both armies spoke of a heavy, still air that kept the smoke of the 
battle close to the ground. Assuming everyone's recollections of weather 
conditions were accurate," Cozzens argued, "the most reasonable conclu-
sion is that the rolling ground close to the fighting dissipated the breeze 
Ord's men felt, and that the damp air on the battlefield deadened sounds 
beyond a mile or two."46 In other words, September 19 brought together a 
combination of at least two of the main factors leading to acoustic shadow. 
Once again, nature constituted a point of friction in the outcome of the 
battle. The Union strategy at Iuka hinged on two factors: first, the read-
iness of all divisions to strike on September 18; second, Ord's ability to 
hear Rosecrans's guns as the signal for his troops to move against Price's 
front. Both miscarried. Stormy weather and rough terrain impeded the 
timely progress of Rosecrans's troops against Price. Poor communication 
between Grant and his subordinate officers, due in part to bad weather 
and difficult terrain but also to simple bad management, was made worse 
by the larger phenomenon of acoustic shadow and prevented Ord from 
completing his orders. In the battle of Iuka, the Union officers charged 
with making on-the-ground decisions failed to adapt their plans to chang-
ing environmental conditions and allowed the enemy to escape. Their 
one consolation, perhaps, was that even though they did not capture 
Price, they did prevent him from invading Tennessee, a primary objective 
of Union strategy in the region. 
PERRYVILLE, KENTUCKY 
In 1862 Kentucky was still up for grabs and both sides were determined 
to take control. Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg, supported by Edmund Kirby 
Smith and Leonidas Polk, led the Confederate Army of the Mississippi. 
Injuly Bragg conducted the largest Confederate railroad operation of the 
war, moving more than forty thousand troops into Tennessee. In early 
September Kirby Smith entered Kentucky via Knoxville with approxi-
mately 21,000 troops; Bragg marched north from Chattanooga, bringing 
with him 22,500 Confederates, hoping to gain men, materiel, and sup-
port from the locals. Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell commanded the 60,000 
troops opposing Bragg. Federal strategy required that Kentucky remain in 
Union hands, so a fight was sure to ensue. 
The battle of Perryville on October 7 and 8, 1862, began over access to 
water. "The particular battle that developed," Russell Weigley observed, 
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"was not the one intended by either side. Federal troops were trying to 
ease a water shortage - the weather was still warm and uncommonly dry-
from pools along Doctor's Creek," a small stream that ran north and west 
of the town.47 On October 7 Polk took up defensive positions with his six-
teen thousand troops just west of Perryville's main stream, the Chaplin 
River. That evening Maj. Gen. Thomas Crittenden's 2nd Corps "arrived 
and attacked unsuccessfully to gain control of the few stagnant pools in 
a tributary of the river."48 The following morning, Philip Sheridan's 11th 
Division launched an offensive that captured Doctor's Creek and the sur-
rounding hills. "Sheridan might have set the stage for a decisive Union 
victory,'' Weigley suggested, but none of his fellow Union command-
ers knew anything about his fight. In particular, Sheridan's commanding 
officer, Buell, was completely ignorant of the unfolding events. 
A westerly breeze blew through the area, creating an acoustic shadow 
over Euell's headquarters just three miles from the battlefield. As histo-
rian Kenneth Noe remarked, "Nature as well as habitual overmanage-
ment, overconfidence, and the consequences of his bruising fall the pre-
vious evening now combined to play a cruel joke on Buell." The wind 
and the rolling terrain of the Chaplin Hills "bent the sound waves pro-
duced by the musketry west of the field" so only a few of the cannon 
were audible at Euell's headquarters. Furthermore, "no smoke rose along 
the horizon either, as the wind drove it north or east." Finally, "unable to 
fathom that the Confederates might not wait for him to perfect his lines 
and attack on the morrow as planned, Buell immediately concluded that 
either another artillery duel or at worst a skirmish had flared up." He per-
ceived the sounds as indicators of a waste of ammunition and powder and 
ordered it stopped. However, two hours later Buell "finally learned that 
both his army and his career were in for the fight of their lives."49 
Ultimately, Euell's failure to support Sheridan's effort resulted in a court 
of inquiry regarding the commanding officer's conduct during operations 
in Kentucky and Tennessee. The following report by J. Holt to the Secre-
tary of War briefly explains the reasons for the investigation: 
There are circumstances attending this brief but bloody engagement which 
baffle comprehension. General Buell, who had approached Perryville con-
scious of the presence there of the enemy in force, retired to headquarters, 
2 112 miles in the rear of his left wing, and, surrounded by a large and well -
organized staff, was ignorant of the struggle until too late to render aid, al-
though he heard the furious cannonade that gave token of a combat about 
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2 o'clock, pronouncing it a waste of ammunition and demanding that it should 
stop, took no steps, either through the signal corps then in operation or by his 
staff, to investigate the cause, or, if necessary, to apply a remedy.50 
In his defense, Buell noted, "It has been a matter of surprise that so severe 
an engagement could have taken place within 2 112 miles of my headquar-
ters without my knowledge. The commander of an army covering a line 
6 or 7 miles long, interspersed with woods and hills, must of necessity 
depend on the reports of his generals for information of what is transpir-
ing on different parts of the field." He stated that because his army did not 
get into position when he expected, he did not anticipate a major engage-
ment on the 8th. Furthermore, "a good deal of artillery firing had been 
going on between the advance guards of the two armies since our arrival 
the evening before, excepting at night. The cause of this was well under-
stood, and the greater or less rapidity of the firing at intervals was not a 
matter to attract particular attention, especially as it was to be expected 
that information of anything of serious import would be promptly con-
veyed to me. For that reason," Buell continued, "I received with astonish-
ment the intelligence of the severe fighting that commenced at 2 o'clock. 
Not a musket-shot had been heard nor did the sound of artillery indicate 
anything like a battle." Buell explained that his failure to hear the sounds 
of battle "was probably caused by the configuration of the ground, which 
broke the sound, and by the heavy wind, which it appears blew from 
the right to the left during the day." He claimed that hundreds could be 
brought before the commission to testify to that effect.51 
In his history of the battle, Russell Weigley wrote, "Here was another ex-
ample of acoustic shadow, similar to the one at Iuka: the failure sometimes 
of even the sound of a large-scale battle to carry to nearby troops." Weig-
ley attributed the acoustic shadow to "the unevenness of the ground. "52 
According to James McPherson, "Less than half of the Union army was 
engaged in this fighting, while a freak combination of wind and topog-
raphy ... prevented the right wing and Buell himself from hearing the 
battle a couple of miles away."53 Charles Ross suggested that the "weather 
was clear and cool on the day of the battle at Perryville" and that "the 
refraction effect" was "extreme." He noted that the "terrain and bizarre 
acoustics contributed to making Perryville a very chaotic fight, with units 
on both sides unexpectedly finding themselves mixed in with the enemy."54 
If the acoustic shadow caused Buell to be "bathed in silence,'' in Ross's 
words, then it provided Bragg an advantage during his retreat. Weigley 
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wrote that Bragg "contrived to break off the action and to slip away, no 
small tactical accomplishment even with the help of the quirky passage 
of sound."55 In this instance of acoustic shadow, nature created a point of 
friction that Buell simply could not overcome. 
The battle of Perryville is considered by many historians as one of the 
most savage of the war. Perryville was arguably a Confederate victory, al-
beit a pyrrhic one. Massive casualties and the belief that Buell was bring-
ing his entire force to bear against his own tattered troops the following 
day (in reality, Euell's entire army had been there the whole time, just 
not engaged), Bragg chose to withdraw. Perryville was the last battle in 
the Confederacy's bid for Kentucky, but Euell's failure to participate in 
the fight meant that he earned no credit for that important development 
in the Union's war efforts. Buell lost his command later that month, and 
though his arrogance and frequent missteps contributed to his fate, the 
friction caused by acoustic shadow at Perryville proved to be the fatal 
blow to his military career. 
Concluding Thoughts 
The foregoing pages intended to demonstrate the ways in which the con-
cepts common to military history, Clausewitz's notion of friction in par-
ticular, might be useful to environmental historians as they embark on 
analyses of nature's role in the Civil War. Clausewitz provided clear anal-
ysis of the major factors affecting military outcomes and, most impor-
tantly for our purposes here, he developed language that those who study 
the war can use to communicate effectively, regardless of their disciplin-
ary background. Military historians and geographers have long seen the 
utility of Clausewitzian analysis and have integrated his theories and ter-
minology into their work on the Civil War. In recent years environmental 
historians interested in the intersections of war and nature have discov-
ered mutually beneficial overlap in their work and that of military schol-
ars. However, they have also correctly pointed out that though they and 
their military counterparts share common ground in wanting to under-
stand the reciprocal influences between environmental forces and con-
ditions and military developments, they often fail to communicate. This 
breakdown in communication need not continue to impede the fruitful 
discussions environmental and military scholars are cultivating within the 
context of the Civil War, especially since Clausewitz's notion of friction, 
so familiar to historians of war, is closely analogous to environmental his-
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torians' use of the concept of agency with regard to nature. We need not 
continue to reside in academic acoustic shadows. Instead, like Clause-
witz's "good general," we must "know friction in order to overcome it" 
and we must push our analyses of the Civil War beyond an exercise on 
paper and into the real world of nature. 
Notes 
I would like to acknowledge the participants of The Blue, the Gray, and the Green 
conference at the University of Georgia, especially Steven Berry, Brian Drake, 
and Bert Way, and the members of the Environment and Society Interdisciplinary 
Research Group at Boise State University for their insightful critiques and their 
encouragement and support Special thanks to the anonymous reviewers whose 
comments inspired me to improve my thinking and my writing. 
I.James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil J#zr Era (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 584. 
2. Harold A. Winters et al., "Too Much and Too Wet: The Civil War Mud 
March and Flanders' Fields," in Battling the Elements: Weather and Terrain in the Con-
duct of War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 36. 
3. Ibid., 38. 
4. Ted Steinberg, "The Great Food Fight," Down to Earth: Nature's Role in 
American History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 91. 
5. Winters et al., "Too Much and Too Wet," 38. 
6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 119. See also Clausewitz, "Friktion 
im Krieg," Vom Kriege (Darmstadt: Weltbild Verlag, 1990), 77-79. 
7. Clausewitz, On War, 120. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Stephen]. Cimbala, Clausewitz and Chaos: Friction in J#zr and Military Policy 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 2. 
10. Jon Tetsuro Sumida, Decoding Clausewitz: A New Approach to "On War" (Law-
rence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 2. 
11. See, for example, Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, trans. 
Christine Booker and Norman Stone (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); 
Cimbala, Clausewitz and Chaos; Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His 
Theories and His Times (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Sumida, 
Decoding Clausewitz 
12. Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of 
War,'' International Security 17, no. 3 (1992- 1993): 90. 
13. Ibid., 70. 
14. Ibid. , 76-77. Beyerchen explained, "From this perspective, [Clausewitz's] fa-
mous metaphor of the 'fog' of war is not so much about a dearth of information as 
how distortion and overload of information produce uncertainty as to the actual 
state of affairs" (77). Here Beyerchen refers to Clausewitz's statement, "Finally, 
the general unreliability of all information presents a special problem in war: all 
:c 
Nature as Friction 161 
action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which, like fog or moonlight, 
often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are" (On 
War, 140). Eugenia C. Kiesling questions whether Clausewitz saw fog as an apt 
metaphor for the chaos of war. See Kiesling, "On War without the Fog," Military 
Review, September-October, 2001, 85-87. 
15. Barry D. Watts, Cfuusewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Paper 52 
(Washington, D.C: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense Uni-
versity, October 1996), 84. 
16. Ibid., 104. 
17. Ibid., 106. 
18. Donald Worster, "The Ecology of Order and Chaos," Environmental History 
Review 14, no. 112 (1990): 1- 18. 
19. Lutz Becks and Hartmut Arndt, "Transitions from Stable Equilibria to Chaos, 
and Back, in an Experimental Food Web," Ecology 89, no. 11 (2008): 3225-26. 
20. Charles Ross, "Shh! Battle in Progress!," Civil War Times Illustrated 35, no. 
6 (1996): 56-58. See also, Ross, Civil War Acoustic Shadows (Shippensburg, Pa.: 
White Mane Books, 2001). 
21. Ross, "Shh! Battle in Progress!," passim 
22. Ulysses S. Grant to G. W. Cullum, February 8, 1862, Official Records of the 
~r of the Rebellion (hereafter OR) ser. 1, vol. 7, 596. 
23. Henry Wager Halleck to Don Carlos Buell, February 12, 1862, OR, ser. 1, 
vol. 7, 609. 
24. Halleck to George B. McClellan, February 16, 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 7, 626. 
25. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 398. 
26. Grant to Halleck, February 14, 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 7, 613. 
27.John A. McClemand to Grant, February 28, 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 7, 174. 
28. Lew Wallace to J ohn A. Rawlins, February 20, 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 7, 237. 
29. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 400. 
30. Ross, "Shh! Battle in Progress!," 59. Interestingly, Grant attributed no cause 
to this failure, other than that he did not expect a Confederate attack. See Grant to 
Cullum, February 16, 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 7, 159-60. 
31. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 400. 
32. Grant to Halleck, February 16, 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 7, 625. 
33. Grant, "General Orders No. 2," OR, ser. 1, vol. 7, 629. 
34. Michael B. Ballard, The Civil War in Mississippi: Major Campaigns and Battles 
(Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2011), 60. 
35. Ulysses S. Grant to Henry Halleck, October 22, 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 24, 67. 
36. Robert Collins Suhr, "Small but Savage Battle of Iuka," America's Civil War 
12, no. 2 (1999), 45. 
37. Ballard, The Civil War in Mississippi, 64. 
38. Russell F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-
1865 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 156. 
39. E. 0. C. Ord to Grant, September 19, 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 24, 119. 
40. E. 0. C. Ord to Grant, September 20, 1862, OR, ser. 1, vol. 24, 110. 
41. Ibid. 
42. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 523. 
162 Lisa M. Brady 
c: 
cu 
cu 
..... 
0 
cu 
..c: 
...... 
43. Ross, "Shh! Battle in Progress! ," 58. 
44. Weigley, A Great Civil War, 156. 
45. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 522-23. 
46. Peter Cozzens, The Darkest Days of the ~r: The Battles of Iuka and Corinth 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 129-30. 
47. Weigley, A Great Civil ~r, 158-59. 
48. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 519. 
49. Kenneth W Noe, Perryville: This Grand Havoc of Battle (Lexington: University 
Press of Kentucky, 2001), 215. 
50. J. Holt by request of Lt. Col. Platt, to Secretary of War, May 23, 1863, OR, 
ser. 1, vol. 22, 20-21. 
51. Don Carlos Buell, "Statement of Major-General Buell in review of the evi-
dence before the Military Commission," sub-inclosure no. 2, May 5, 1863, OR, 
ser. 1, vol. 22, p. 50-51. 
52. Weigley, A Great Civil War, 159. 
53. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 520. 
54. Ross, "Shh! Battle in Progress!," 61. 
55. Weigley, A Great Civil War, 159. 
